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Chapter 6
Secrecy versus transparency 




In 2013, Edward Snowden, the former National Security Agency (NSA) con-
tractor, copied classified documents that revealed the scope of US govern-
ment surveillance. The leaked documents referred to secret programs that 
enabled the collection of metadata on foreign and American citizens, and to 
the interception of domestic internet communications leading to the creation 
of an enormous database by government surveillance agencies with access 
to personal communications, including emails, social network entries, audio 
and video chats, visited websites, and medical and financial records (Olmsted 
2018; Greenwald 2014; Gurnow 2014). Snowden’s revelations ignited social 
and political discussion concerning the scope of government surveillance 
powers, as well as the impact of the secret NSA programs on the privacy of 
American citizens and on various potential violations of the constitution by 
the authorities (Goldfarb 2015; Lyon 2015; Kitrosser 2015). The substance of 
the leaked documents ignited an academic debate on the functioning of the 
US foreign and domestic surveillance system and its impact on the state of 
democracy and the rule of law.
Research has been conducted with regard to both national security and 
domestic surveillance in the United States, with a focus on the powers of 
institutions responsible for conducting or controlling surveillance procedures, 
as well as on the conflict this has caused between freedom and security (Farrell 
and Newman  2019; Johnson 2018; Keller 2017;  Goldfarb 2015; Lester 2015; 
Angwin 2014) and between secrecy and transparency (Graham 2017; Frost 
2017; Kitrosser 2015; Arnold 2014). It is no surprise to learn that the NSA 
was the most studied institution (Hayden 2018; Edgar 2017), but important 
analysis has also been done with regard to the surveillance activities of the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) (Johnson 2018; Prados 2014) and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) (McCabe 2019). Studies focusing on 
concrete surveillance institutions have had at least one thing in common: a 















preserving, and defending a complex system of secret surveillance aimed at 
providing national security.
Unlike the case of post- 9/ 11 legislation and executive action, when the 
main theme of the public debate focused on the clash between freedom and 
security (Herman 2011; Posner and Vermeule 2006; Davis and Silver 2003), 
the post- Snowden era has been marked by a more frequent reference to the 
clash between two other important features of a surveillance state: secrecy and 
transparency. The debate has raised questions concerning the excessiveness of 
the US secrecy regime with respect to surveillance policies, appealing to the 
necessity of imposing broader transparency measures which would restore 
democracy and enable a proper oversight of the government’s actions (Edgar 
2017). Transparency has become the most demanded value, treated by many 
as a remedy for the overwhelming system of excessive secrecy and over- 
classification (Goldfarb 2015; Kitrosser 2015).
The problem the chapter addresses concerns the struggle between secrecy 
and transparency rooted in the institutional and systemic mechanisms of the 
separation of powers and the checks and balances system in the United States. 
I argue that in the area of national security surveillance, the adherence of the 
executive toward secrecy outweighs transparency as promoted by Congress 
and defended by the judicial branch. It seems that— not despite but because 
of the separation of powers doctrine— there is more secrecy rather than trans-
parency in US national security surveillance, which may lead to an argument 
about the illusion of transparency within the national security framework. 
The illusion, understood as a difference between the reality and the perception 
of the reality, in this context means that although the government has under-
taken several legal and political measures to achieve the socially demanded 
level of transparency, the result has been more a matter of perceived than 
actual change, due to the engagement of all branches in the defense of secret 
surveillance. The chapter analyzes the policies of these branches toward the 
conflict between secrecy and transparency in the area of national security 
surveillance in the pre- and post- Snowden eras. Due to the fact that congres-
sional legislation, executive action, and judicial interpretation of surveillance 
measures are intertwined, the empirical analysis is conducted in chronological 
order, focusing on the most important issues occurring before and after 2013.
For the purpose of the study, surveillance is defined as “the collection of 
information in order to manage control” (Lyon 2015, 3) with “the intention to 
protect, understand … or influence groups or individuals” (Kuntze 2018, 45). 
Considering government surveillance, it seems obvious that in a democratic 
state there should be a mutual relationship based on control: the authorities 
control the society, and the society controls the authorities, although the 
character of the two types of control is quite different and is conducted with 
varying intensity. By managing control, the surveilling party influences the 
lives of surveilled subjects, often justifying it by the need to protect them; 
however, the scope of this protection is determined by means of surveillance 
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and its more (or less) secretive character. The biggest challenge concerns the 
level of understanding among the subjects of the surveillance relationship, as 
it often has an impact on the scope of the accountability of the surveillance 
programs. This can be seen especially in government surveillance, where the 
society, aware of the authorities’ need to impose certain measures of surveil-
lance, is reluctant to approve the culture of secrecy in which the surveillance 
state is shrouded (Arnold 2014). In what follows, government surveillance 
shall refer to national security surveillance, that is, US foreign intelligence sur-
veillance and other surveillance activities conducted by the intelligence com-
munity, as well as by the institutions involved in such activities (Friedman and 
Hansen 2012). Although the 2013 leaks revealed the scope of US surveillance 
of foreigners, including political leaders, and thus affecting transatlantic 
relations (Cole et al. 2017), the analysis focuses mainly on those aspects of 
national security surveillance which were directed toward American citizens, 
raising the problem of constitutionality and governmental accountability.
In discussions of national security surveillance, transparency should be 
understood as oversight and control of the activities of institutions involved 
in conducting government surveillance, rather than the full disclosure of 
information concerning surveillance programs and their outcomes. In order 
to pursue the politics of national security effectively, the government must 
be allowed to act in partial secrecy and to select the means necessary to pro-
vide the expected level of safety to its citizens (Cain 2015, 41). But the lack 
of control from oversight institutions may lead to the abuse of power and to 
violations of the rights and freedoms of individuals, who demand a certain 
level of transparency from their government. Such a level could be reached, 
for example, by legislation limiting the scope of national security surveillance, 
as well as by institutional solutions providing for a system of effective over-
sight imposed on different levels and in different relations (Eskens et al. 2015, 
8). From the perspective of the separation of powers, control over executive 
actions should be conducted by both Congress and the judiciary, despite the 
different character of their functioning. It seems that without the people’s 
knowledge of the scale and character of government surveillance, resulting 
from the effects of this congressional and judicial oversight, there is neither 
democratic accountability nor the proper functioning of the constitution as a 
fundamental guarantee of individuals’ rights.
The core question about the relation between secrecy and transparency 
is not new to surveillance studies and has been examined from various 
perspectives (Moses and de Koker 2017; Lyon 2014; Ball et al. 2012; Friedman 
and Hansen 2012; Theoharis 2011; Herman 2011). The methodology of pol-
itical and legal sciences applied here, based on historical institutionalism and 
systemic analysis, will focus on the character of the separation of powers doc-
trine, which evolved along with the growth of the secret surveillance state. 
The system revealed by Snowden, who uncovered a secret web of programs 








courts, affected the checks and balances system (Goldfarb 2015; Arnold 2014; 
Greenwald 2014). Some researchers placed the responsibility for the existence 
of the secret surveillance state on concrete examples in specific presidential 
administrations (Graham 2017; Glennon 2015; Theoharis 2011); some tried 
to find the explanation for the temporary violation of the rights and freedoms 
of individuals in a state of emergency (Edgar 2017); and others have explained 
that the executive acted in accordance with the Constitution (Calabresi and 
Yoo 2012). These research findings confirmed conflicting arguments raised 
by politicians, journalists, and American citizens, who presented different 
approaches toward the interpretation of the constitutional powers of the gov-
ernment with respect to its surveillance competences. My argument focuses 
mainly on the scope of the separation of powers doctrine, which is the key 
to understanding why the transparency of national security surveillance has 
been an illusion, rather than a reality.
National security surveillance pre- Snowden
The Cold War era
The national security paradigm has always been rooted in the American polit-
ical system, becoming an indispensable element of the policies of most presi-
dential administrations. It has been systematically used since the late 1940s, 
usually applied by the executive with regard to foreign policy (Theoharis 
2011, 133– 5). The separation of powers was not in the spotlight of early Cold 
War national security legislation, but Congress was aware that the expan-
sion of executive powers should be somehow controlled by other government 
branches. The National Security Act of 1947 placed theoretical limitations on 
the functioning of the intelligence community, by requiring the president to 
keep Congress “fully and currently informed of the intelligence activities of 
the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence activity” 
(National Security Act 1947). The law confirmed congressional oversight over 
intelligence activities, but it was obvious that the scope of control and trans-
parency would depend on a president’s will.
Five years later, President Harry Truman issued a top- secret directive 
establishing the NSA, responsible for monitoring communications out of the 
United States (Glennon 2015, 12– 13). In order to achieve national security 
goals, the government operated several secret surveillance programs aimed at 
both foreign and national subjects. Institutionally, all three major agencies, 
the NSA, the CIA, and the FBI, were involved in the process of protecting 
national security during the Cold War era, and their activities were held far 
from public scrutiny due to the imposition of a broad secrecy system (Edgar 
2017). Surveillance measures quickly became an effective tool of govern-
ment agencies’ control of the communications and activities of US persons 
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was involved not only in counterintelligence but strictly collaborated with 
both the CIA and the FBI in sharing information about foreign and domestic 
threats to national security (Keller 2017).
The truth about several secret surveillance programs was revealed 
during the investigations conducted by congressional oversight committees 
established in the mid- 1970s: the Pike Committee (House) and the Church 
Committee (Senate). The investigations focused on the secret and— in many 
respects— illegal programs conducted by the CIA and NSA, as well as on 
the FBI’s wiretapping of politicians and journalists (Prados 2014). The 
Church Committee’s investigation, followed by a series of reports, not only 
disclosed the scope of national security surveillance for domestic reasons but 
also raised concerns about the character of the separation of powers with 
regard to national security surveillance. The Committee found that “intelli-
gence activities were essentially exempted from the normal system of checks 
and balances,” decreasing the constitutional accountability of the executive, 
which had an exclusive role in conducting national security policies, including 
surveillance of US citizens. The report indicated that the executive agencies 
applied excessive secrecy in their conduct of surveillance programs in order 
to limit congressional oversight and the knowledge of the people targeted by 
government due to their political beliefs (Church Committee Report 1976).
As a result, Congress established two stable oversight bodies whose role was 
to control foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities and expanded 
the powers of the justice committees of both houses to oversee the actions of 
domestic surveillance agencies (Glennon 2015; Solove 2011). Furthermore, 
in 1978 Congress implemented the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
(FISA), introducing higher judicial scrutiny over national security surveil-
lance measures and establishing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court 
(FISC) to grant warrants for the surveillance of those who were suspected of 
being foreign agents (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 1978). The means 
of appointment of FISC judges, as well as the length of their tenure and the 
necessity to close the court’s proceedings to the public, were aimed at produ-
cing a system of judicial check on the activities of institutions imposing sur-
veillance, without violating the sensitive character of the cases discussed. On 
the other hand, the special court had to operate on the basis of information 
and documents provided solely by the executive, which made its proceedings 
and decision- making process dependent on the value and relevance of the 
shared data (Glennon 2015, 45). Theoretically, transparency was weakened 
by institutional secrecy.
The analysis of the legislative and institutional effects of the committees’ 
investigations proves that Congress did not want to strip the executive of the 
power to exercise its constitutional goal of providing security to US citizens. 
The secrecy rule guiding the FISC procedures, and the discretionary power 
of the executive to control the content of shared information with the judges, 





institutional changes within the government significantly limited the scope of 
national security surveillance. Furthermore, the Supreme Court confirmed— 
or at least did not neglect— the leading role of the executive in implementing 
and operating national security policy, even if  it resulted in violations of the 
civil rights of Americans. The reference to the privilege of state secrets in the 
dispute over the crash of a military plane (United States v. Reynolds 1953), 
lack of ripeness in a case concerning US Army surveillance of American 
citizens (Laird v. Tatum 1972), or the limitation of First Amendment rights 
during the Red Scare era of the early 1950s (Dennis v. United States 1951) may 
serve as good examples of the strengthening of the government’s powers for 
national security reasons.
The post- 9/ 11 era
The secrecy of national security surveillance was again at the center of US 
political debate after the terrorist attack of 9/ 11, when Congress implemented 
antiterrorist legislation. The USA Patriot Act became the main source of 
power for the federal institutions responsible for law enforcement and intel-
ligence activities (Smith and Hung 2010). Among various provisions deter-
mining the relations between executive agencies, the Act introduced National 
Security Letters (NSL), issued without judicial control by the FBI, and roving 
wiretaps focusing on individual persons rather than the devices which they 
used (USA Patriot Act 2001). Generally, Congress agreed to expand execu-
tive powers by delegating vast competences to executive agencies, referring to 
the times of emergency (Akerman 2006), which allowed the George W. Bush 
administration to justify its national security policy.
Among several measures undertaken by the administration was a secret 
program, called Stellar Wind, which became public due to a press leak in 
2005 (Fisher 2013, 251– 2), as a part of a broader Terrorist Surveillance 
Program (TSP) implemented in 2002 (Kuntze 2018, 82). Its main purpose 
was to collect international phone calls and emails of targets suspected of 
organized terrorism, but in addition to data on foreign nationals the program 
allowed the NSA to intercept and store metadata from telephone and internet 
providers, including information about the private communications of US 
citizens (Edgar 2017, 40). Importantly, Stellar Wind not only lacked the 
approval of Congress and the judiciary, including the FISC, but it was also 
based on an internal memorandum created by the Office of Legal Counsel 
(OLC). The document assumed that presidents— based on unitary executive 
theory— had almost unlimited power in determining the scope of govern-
ment surveillance (Posner and Vermeule 2006). The theory claimed that the 
president, as commander- in- chief, had the power to initiate any surveillance 
program, because all executive power belonged to the president, especially in 
times of war and emergency (Goldfarb 2015). Apart from legitimizing Stellar 
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control by other branches of government was justified by the necessity to 
keep the programs secret (Lester 2015).
In 2007, the government decided to launch a new national security surveil-
lance program, called PRISM, to monitor the data of the users of the most 
important internet providers. As a result, in order to provide information 
necessary to limit the terrorist threat the NSA secretly collected, stored, and 
analyzed billions of items of data on US citizens (Edgar 2017, 5). In contrast 
to Stellar Wind, PRISM was based on congressional authorization, Section 
702 of the Protect America Act (2007), and the FISA Amendments Act 
(2008). The legislation permitted the government to intercept communications 
inside the country connected with foreign suspects of terrorism, but it had 
to be approved by the FISC, which applied minimization rules in order to 
protect the rights of American citizens. Still, the reasonable belief  standard 
substituted the former probable cause standard, thus making it easier for the 
government to obtain FISC approval.
According to Section 702 of the 2007 Act, the government also conducted so- 
called upstream collection, which focused only on domestic communications 
by intercepting information from major internet cables and switches in the 
flow of communications between communication service providers (Edelson 
2016, 120). The executive also used the amended Section 215 of the Patriot 
Act to intercept data from domestic bulk collection of international and 
domestic telephone records. It guaranteed thousands of numbers analyzed 
with regard to one seed number, providing for the almost infinite collection 
of data concerning US persons (USA Patriot Act Additional Reauthorizing 
Amendments of 2006).
All these programs introduced some level of control over the surveillance 
activities of the executive. After 2006 especially, Congress and the courts 
became more actively involved in the process of overseeing national security 
surveillance measures imposed by the NSA or FBI. Still, national security sur-
veillance, or rather dataveillance (Lyon 2014; van Dijck 2014), was imposed 
so broadly that there was no way for the oversight institutions to exercise their 
powers effectively. The collection of the electronic data of foreign and US 
citizens by government agencies was often conducted without the approval of 
FISC, or based on a general acceptance of the operation of certain surveil-
lance programs by the court (Glennon 2015). Despite theoretically broader 
congressional and judicial control of the surveillance measures, there was a 
lot of criticism that too much information was kept secret, thus leading to 
potential overuse of executive powers (Herman 2011; Romero and Temple- 
Raston 2007).
Barack Obama’s win in 2008 gave hope to his supporters of a change in the 
national security surveillance system, especially with regard to the scope of 
powers of the executive, and the level of transparency (Olmsted 2018, 220). 
As a Senator, Obama had criticized the administration’s accumulation of 







concrete NSA surveillance program (Edgar 2017, 51– 52). As a presidential 
candidate he referred to the greater transparency of the government’s sur-
veillance programs (Graham 2017, 180– 181). The fact is that as president, 
Obama modified, and even expanded, some of the surveillance programs 
initiated by the Bush administration. He decided to continue programs based 
on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, approved the continuation of PRISM 
based on Section 702 of FISA, actively used the NSL, and signed the exten-
sion of the FISA Amendments Act (Graham 2017; Glennon 2015). It seems 
as if  the main purpose of Obama’s administration was to adapt the law to 
serve the purposes of the politics of surveillance rather than impose a new 
system of transparency.
National security surveillance post- Snowden
Soon after the Snowden revelations, President Obama insisted on conducting 
a broad investigation of NSA surveillance, appointing a Review Group on 
Intelligence and Communications Technology. It recommended several 
reforms, from terminating the existing surveillance programs to preserving 
a limited impact of the NSA on the collection of the data necessary to con-
duct effective surveillance against potential terrorists (Kitrosser 2015, 338). 
In early 2014, the White House issued a directive that clearly stated that 
“the collection of signals intelligence [was] necessary for the United States 
to advance its national security and foreign policy interests and to protect its 
citizens and the citizens of its allies and partners from harm” (Presidential 
Policy Directive 2014, 28). As a confirmation of the differences between the 
rhetoric and activities of the presidential administration, Obama’s govern-
ment denied access to several requests for information about government 
actions (Keller 2017, 31).
At the same time, Congress initiated a discussion over legislative reform 
that would legalize the existing surveillance programs. The Privacy and Civil 
Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB) produced a report that concluded that 
the NSA’s program of bulk collection of  phone data raised several consti-
tutional issues concerning both the scope of  executive powers and poten-
tial violations of  individuals’ freedoms. The report determined certain NSA 
surveillance programs as illegal and ineffective, thus raising several doubts 
concerning their continuation (The Report of the PCLOB). With regard 
to the bulk collection of  phone metadata, the Board suggested that the 
program should be terminated, determining also that the way to intercept 
the communications stored by telecommunications companies was to obtain 
the approval of  FISC for every individual case of  reasonable surveillance 
(Graham 2017, 197– 8).
Finally, in June 2015, the USA Freedom Act (2015) was enacted, thus 
ending the government surveillance program of bulk collection of metadata. 
The Act forced the government to obtain FISC warrants in order to conduct 
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the collection of data from telecommunications companies for foreign intel-
ligence reasons. For the purpose of preventing previous procedural flaws, 
judges received expert support from technical and privacy advisers, and their 
legal interpretations became public. Important change was made with respect 
to the records collected by telecommunications companies, which stored them 
instead of the NSA; however, the agency could gain access to these records 
given FISC approval. The Act also limited the NSA’s access to targeted indi-
viduals’ phone records and the records of the phone numbers associated with 
them (Graham 2017, 198; Olmsted 2018, 223).
Despite strengthening the checks and balances system with regard to judi-
cial control of government surveillance, and ending the bulk collection of 
metadata, no serious changes were introduced to the institutional and struc-
tural aspects of surveillance programs. Actually, the bulk collection of meta-
data ended six months after the implementation of the Freedom Act, as the 
presidential administration asked FISC for a transition period that would 
allow the analysts to end their work (Edelson 2016, 116). Still, the government 
did not suggest the creation of any new oversight system, but a strengthening 
of the existing one with effective control of congressional committees and 
FISC, and the support of such institutions as PCLOB. Analysis of the legal 
regulations governing the functioning of the oversight system proves, however, 
that the scope of control of the surveillance measures depended on the will 
of the executive, which could easily hide behind national security arguments. 
And even the publication of annual transparency reports by the NSA did not 
change the feeling that there was more of a rhetoric of openness rather than 
real transparency (Alloa and Thoma 2018).
Apart from legislative changes, Snowden’s actions also had an impact on 
decisions made by the judicial branch. Until 2013 the courts usually applied 
the state secrets privilege in lawsuits filed by US citizens who believed that 
government surveillance violated their constitutional rights. Both the Bush 
and Obama administrations defended the challenged programs, referring 
to the necessity to protect national security surveillance, and the courts 
repeatedly declared the lack of  standing of  the challengers. Even in 2013 
such verdicts were announced by the Supreme Court, where the claims 
were defined as based on “speculation and on a predicted chain of  events 
that might never occur” (Clapper v. Amnesty International 2013). However, 
Snowden’s revelation of  the scope and character of  the NSA’s surveillance 
legitimized the lawsuits filed by individuals and civil liberties organizations 
challenging the constitutionality of  national security surveillance. In late 
2013, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) challenged the NSA’s 
program of bulk collection of  phone metadata in the US District Court for 
the Southern District of  New York. The court ruled for the government, 
finding no violation of  the rights of  citizens who lacked a reasonable expect-
ation of  privacy while providing information to telecommunications com-
panies. However, the appeal of  the ACLU to the US Court of  Appeals for 
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the Second Circuit proved successful, leading to a decision on the illegal 
status of  the bulk telephone metadata program, as a violation of  Section 215 
of  the Patriot Act (ACLU v. Clapper 2013).
A similar decision was made by the US District Court for the District 
of  Columbia in December 2013, when judge Richard J. Leon called the 
NSA program an indiscriminate and arbitrary invasion of  the privacy rights 
protected by the Fourth Amendment (Klayman v. Obama 2013). Such an 
inconsistency as that between Klayman and Clapper proves the existence of 
conflicting approaches in the judicial branch toward national security sur-
veillance. Both decisions ignited the discussion in Congress about the future 
of  the bulk collection of  phone data, which resulted in the termination of 
the program by the provisions of  the Freedom Act (Edgar 2017, 4). Judicial 
control over the legality of  national security surveillance affected the legis-
lative process, but it would be too far reaching a conclusion to say that the 
legislative and judicial branches became united against the secret surveil-
lance system imposed by the executive, as the Court of  Appeals’ decision 
was the only serious limitation of  national security surveillance in the post- 
Snowden era.
There is no surprise that the next president, Donald Trump, became a 
strong supporter of national security surveillance. In 2015, during the debate 
concerning the future of bulk collection of phone metadata, he expressed his 
support for the program (Council on Foreign Relations 2015). But when he 
became the subject of a secret FBI investigation about possible connections 
between his campaign and Russian intelligence, Trump accused the Obama 
administration of illegal surveillance. Time showed that Trump’s negative 
attitude toward the leaders of intelligence and law enforcement agencies 
determined his personal decisions as president (Hayden 2018, 139– 41). 
Trump’s critical attitude toward the FBI, CIA, and NSA led to a decrease in 
trust among Republican voters toward the national security agencies, in con-
trast to some Democratic voters (Nelson 2018, 181). From an institutional 
perspective, the beginning of Trump’s presidency marked a politicization of 
national security surveillance, the source of which was the personal opinion 
of the President as an alleged subject of illegal wiretapping.
On the other hand, at the beginning of the second year of Trump’s tenure 
Congress passed the reauthorization of Section 702 of FISA. The legislation 
was preceded by a few months of public debate concerning the effectiveness 
of the transparency system under the existing regulations. Despite concerns 
of the Democrats that the intelligence community would be endangered by 
the President’s influence on surveillance programs, the law was presented 
as a safeguard for civil liberties and an assurance of greater transparency 
(Goldsmith and Hennessey 2018). Due to the lack of a serious national 
security surveillance scandal, the proponents of the new transparency system 
argued, as in 2007 and 2012, that it worked properly thanks to the broad over-
sight system imposed by the legislation. One should remember, however, that 
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the two earlier reauthorizations of the law had raised hopes for a diminishing 
of the level of secrecy of national security surveillance, which did not actually 
happen.
A culture of interbranch secrecy?
Secrecy had always played an important role in the American political 
system from the time of its establishment, becoming a valuable tool during 
the Revolutionary War, when it assured the effectiveness of the govern-
ment (Ginsberg 2016, 7), and during the Philadelphia Convention, when the 
Framers referred to the executive branch as the one possessing “the powers of 
secrecy, vigor, and dispatch” (Farrand 1966, 70). Thus the executive invoked 
the principle of secrecy as a guarantee of its proper functioning (Graham 
2017). The growing impact of secrecy on the operations of the US govern-
ment in the twentieth century led to the notion that there is a specific cul-
ture of secrecy (Moynihan 1997; Theoharis 1998), manifested not only in the 
amount of classified information kept far away from the public’s reach, but— 
above all— in the conviction that secrecy ensures effectiveness and account-
ability (Edgar 2017, 345; Ginsberg 2016, 7).
In the twenty- first century the US government agreed to conduct a 
similar politics of  surveillance, supporting the necessary secrecy of  govern-
ment activities relating to security issues, especially when they were under-
taken by the executive branch (Laidler 2019). The culture of  secrecy is 
obviously rooted in activities undertaken by presidential administrations, 
or is a “product of  the executive branch’s very nature” (Kitrosser 2015, 2). 
The executive, unlike the legislative and judicial branches, has more space to 
act in the shadows because both Congress and the courts operate through 
publicly recorded legislation and written public opinions. Furthermore, the 
executive branch also has access to human and technological resources, 
enabling it to act in broader secrecy than any other part of  the government 
(Kitrosser 2015, 2– 3).
There is surely a contradictory approach toward the scope of transparency 
and secrecy between the executive and legislative branches. While presidents 
have to keep some of their communications and actions secret, Congress’s 
main role is to control these actions either by implementing legislation or 
imposing oversight measures (Lester 2015, 5). Both branches are involved in 
a constitutional tug- of- war in the direction of broader secrecy versus more 
openness. Even the analysis of constitutional provisions concerning the sep-
aration of powers as articulated in Article Two leaves the impression that 
the executive was meant to be the most secret one. All this has led to the 
creation of various theories supporting the secretive powers of the execu-
tive, such as executive privilege, protecting the confidentiality of presidential 
communications from Congress (Frost 2017; Garvey 2014); unitary executive 







powers (Edelson 2016; Calabresi and Yoo 2012); and state secrets privilege, 
limiting public access to certain national security information (Arnold 2014; 
Herman 2011).
These theories are obviously in conflict with the traditional understanding 
of the checks and balances system, as they assume narrow congressional 
oversight and judicial control of the legality of the national security policies 
of the executive. In other words, they legitimized certain policies of presiden-
tial administrations in the pre- and post- Snowden eras, including the impos-
ition of often unlimited surveillance. The controversy is even greater when 
one realizes that the government has the discretionary power to decide which 
information should be kept secret without thoroughly explaining the reasons 
for its classification as such. However rational it would seem with regard to the 
intelligence community, which operates within the realm of secrecy ensuring 
efficacy (Edgar 2017, 76; Sagar 2015, 151), there is no doubt that the execu-
tive has overused the paradigm of national security. Furthermore, whenever 
presidents have announced “times of emergency” it has meant an automatic 
change in the scope of protection of constitutional rights, such as freedom 
of speech, freedom of assembly, due process of law, and the right to privacy 
(Farber 2008; Akerman 2006). Such an approach was usually supported by 
other branches of government, especially the courts, which followed the rule 
that in “times of emergency and peril” the scope of the constitutional pro-
tection of basic rights and freedoms may be limited (Korematsu v. United 
States 1944). There is no doubt that extended surveillance measures have 
played a significant role in the government’s use of emergency powers and 
that national security arguments have enabled the authorities to classify most 
of their operations in that respect.
Of course, stable and ad hoc congressional committees, inspectors general, 
courts, and special tribunals have played an important role in imposing con-
trol on US surveillance legislation and the executive actions of the national 
security state (Glennon 2015). Analysis of the character and results of that 
control proves that, except for the times of increased transparency stemming 
from press publications or leaks of information concerning surveillance 
programs (Keller 2017), there has been no clear indication from the controlling 
institutions about the possible unlawfulness of these programs. Transparency 
has usually resulted from ex post rather than ex ante congressional oversight 
(Lester 2015), which proves that the system governing national security sur-
veillance is more likely to promote secrecy than openness. The debates in 
Congress on the reauthorization or modification of surveillance legislation 
have ended, in most cases, by reaffirming or even expanding the powers of 
executive agencies. The only significant changes in preventing the further 
growth of surveillance powers of the government occurred in times of leaks 
about secret surveillance programs, such as in the 1970s, and after 2005 and 
2013. These were the only moments in which the investigative and oversight 
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powers of Congress proved effective, but the analysis of the legislative and 
institutional outcomes of the postcrisis reforms did not diminish the level of 
secrecy of national security surveillance.
Similarly, the Supreme Court has never ruled against secret surveillance 
conducted by the government, and neither has it limited the agencies’ sur-
veillance powers (Fisher 2017). Furthermore, the Court has never found any 
major national security legislation unconstitutional, especially if  it adjudicated 
in times of emergency (Laidler 2011; Akerman 2006). Despite public criticism 
of certain sections of the Patriot Act by civil rights advocates (Romero and 
Temple- Raston 2007), the Justices did not address the issue of the consti-
tutionality of these provisions, leaving their modification to Congress in a 
politically driven legislative process. Lower federal courts were more active 
in imposing judicial review of the surveillance programs, but when it comes 
down to the constitutionality of these programs the result is vague. The lack 
of a transparent and unified position of the federal judiciary on the scope 
of government surveillance programs strengthens the argument that these 
programs are legal.
Historically, the courts have hesitated to check the constitutionality of the 
actions undertaken by the executive, especially when the powers of intelli-
gence agencies, or foreign policy in general, were at stake (Fisher 2017). That 
leads to another observation, that the federal judiciary was constructed to 
serve mainly as a “national policy- maker” (Dahl 1957), thus supporting not 
only the direction of government policies but legitimizing concrete govern-
ment decisions and programs, provided they protected national security. Even 
if  one argues that such an approach was typical for the early stages of the 
Cold War, the announcement of the “war on terror” by the Bush administra-
tion created an emergency state with national security arguments closing the 
door to any debate on the constitutionality of secret surveillance programs 
(Akerman 2006). The problem clearly lies in the culture of secrecy, which 
may be especially observed with respect to the FISC procedures. If  a judge 
is forced to make a decision concerning the government’s request to impose 
surveillance measures without having access to the full information about the 
program or to the probable cause of the national security danger caused by 
the surveilled subject, it is impossible to obtain transparency. Secrecy forces 
the judicial branch to trust the government in determining the legality of its 
operations, which can be directly observed in the FISC decisions. According 
to existing reports, between 1979 and 2009 it approved more than 99% of gov-
ernment requests for surveillance from 28,000 applications overall (Herman 
2011, 112).
The abovementioned examples prove that the principle of separation 
of powers has been affected by the secrecy of executive actions relating to 
national security and that both Congress and the courts have agreed to play 





The illusion of transparency
The post- Snowden checks and balances system consists of the oversight of 
national security surveillance by the judges of the FISC and by members of 
Congress participating in the works of House and Senate intelligence over-
sight committees, as well as the members of PCLOB, seeking to ensure that 
surveillance programs do not violate the constitutional rights of Americans. 
From the structural perspective, each branch is represented in the system, 
checking whether the institutions responsible for conducting national security 
surveillance are acting in accordance with the constitution. The legislative 
branch has the power to reauthorize national security legislation or to adopt 
new regulations potentially limiting excessive surveillance measures. Congress 
also has control over the annual budget appropriation, which enables the 
operation of surveillance programs, and is thus able to determine the char-
acter of national security surveillance. At the same time, the federal judiciary 
has the potential to adjudicate in cases concerning the right of individuals by 
imposing statutory or constitutional interpretations of government surveil-
lance policies and programs. The power of the courts is not limited to solving 
disputes stemming from excessive surveillance measures imposed by execu-
tive agencies but often comes down to a determination of the parties’ legal 
standing. Additionally, the subjects conducting surveillance, such as the NSA, 
release several reports regarding the scope of their surveillance programs, 
thereby becoming the most transparent intelligence community in US history. 
At least in theory, the current oversight system of national security surveil-
lance should satisfy anyone concerned with the lack of transparency.
In practice, however, when one compares the post- Snowden system with the 
oversight measures established in the 1970s as a consequence of the Church 
and Pike Committees’ reports, there are no serious institutional differences. 
The House and Senate intelligence oversight committees have been monitoring 
national security surveillance since the late 1970s. The level of knowledge of 
committee members of how the national security surveillance system works 
may seem higher than 50 years ago, but real changes in that system resulted 
from uncontrolled leaks to the press rather than effective oversight conducted 
by these committees (Arnold 2014). Similarly, the lack of serious budget cuts 
to national surveillance programs (Goldfarb 2015) reveals the congressional 
attitude toward national security surveillance, not to mention the dramatic 
change in the character and amount of data intercepted by the government 
due to broad programs of electronic surveillance. The scope of national 
security surveillance has changed, but the oversight system does not keep up 
with these changes.
Congress, as the national legislative body, has always used its power to 
implement certain regulations aimed at conducting effective control over 
national security issues. None of the legislation was immune from execu-
tive action, which resulted in further expansion of surveillance powers, often 
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leading to limitations on the rights of individuals as the price for increased 
security. On the other hand, despite very active use of judicial review, the 
Supreme Court rarely entered into the world of national security politics, 
leaving it to presidential discretion and interpretation. Finally, the special 
court approving foreign surveillance requests did not play its role effectively 
for procedural reasons and because of the excessive secrecy around national 
security surveillance. Secrecy is, therefore, a natural element of foreign sur-
veillance, but it is also the main obstacle to conducting proper oversight of 
government surveillance. Excessive secrecy means that the system lacks trans-
parent control over executive actions or that the applied measures of control 
are ineffective and inefficient. In both perspectives, stable or ad hoc control 
is imposed marginally, as the information shared by the executive about the 
scope and character of the surveillance programs is limited by the principle 
of secrecy.
As David Lyon (1994, 24) observes, “surveillance is an institutionally 
central and pervasive feature of social life. Paradoxically, it expanded with 
democracy.” The expansion of national security surveillance became one 
of the key elements in the evolution of the checks and balances system in 
American democracy. That evolution was possible not only due to the role 
of the executive but because Congress and the judicial branch were reluc-
tant to limit presidential attempts to establish a secret national security state. 
Functioning in an almost never- ending state of emergency enabled those 
governing to legitimize the implementation of secret NSA programs aimed 
not only at foreign terrorist suspects but also at American citizens who often 
did not pose any threat to national security. These programs were and still are 
defended for their effectiveness, which may be legitimized only because the 
national security policies are generally kept secret. Whether the purpose of 
such surveillance measures is always achieved seems disputable, but as long 
as the system protects the government in the process of limiting the consti-
tutional rights of Americans there is no way to change it, considering that in 
the contemporary United States, at least in the area of national security sur-
veillance, the meaning of the constitution is determined by all three branches 
of government.
It seems obvious, then, that secrecy and transparency cannot fully coexist 
at the same time; therefore, the institutions responsible for interpretation of 
the law should pose a concrete limit to both values. Such a limit may depend 
on the state of mind of the society: in times of intensified press investigations, 
whistleblower leaks, active operation of oversight committees, and frequent 
judicial review, there is pressure for greater transparency. But in times of 
crisis, wars, or terrorist attacks, secrecy not only prevails but is treated as a 
value by both the authorities and the society (Fung et al. 2008, 106). Post- 9/ 
11 polls indicated that a lot of citizens were ready to give away their freedoms 
for stronger security and approved of the antiterrorist measures imposed by 





In contrast, just after Snowden, when civil liberties were threatened by exces-
sive government surveillance, distrust of the authorities expanded, with four 
out of five citizens negatively evaluating secret surveillance programs (Epstein 
2017, 303).
Analysis of pre- and post- Snowden national security surveillance leads to 
the impression that the demanded transparency has never been and will never 
be achieved, and the main reason for this is the way the separation of powers 
and checks and balances systems work. Although there is no reference in con-
stitutional documents to either secrecy or transparency, the analysis of early 
writings by the Framers proves that they valued the necessity of imposing 
a system of government transparency (Arnold 2014, 31), but, at the same 
time, they accepted a certain level of secrecy, especially of the executive (Frost 
2017, 146). The evolution of the national security state proved, however, that 
if  the government wanted to conduct successful foreign and security policy, 
it had to keep information about surveillance programs out of public reach. 
Furthermore, the government was able to select the means by which it would 
act internationally and domestically; therefore, it was just a matter of time 
until most of the surveillance measures would be cloaked in total secrecy. 
The adoption of several theories to legitimize and justify application of these 
measures was the last step on the way to establishing a secret surveillance 
state. Today, even if  presidents are critical about the level of secrecy of sur-
veillance programs, they prefer to legalize them, rather than withdraw from 
them (Olmsted 2018). Moreover, according to recent public opinion polls, 
such an approach is accepted by the majority of society, which wants to feel 
safe and secure, listing dealing with the terrorism threat as one of the three 
top public priorities (Pew Research Center 2019).
The rhetoric of safety or security has often served as the legitimiza-
tion of surveillance policies, and political leaders in democratic states have 
strongly supported the vision that full security can only be achieved with 
surveillance measures (Green and Zurawski 2015). In times of internal or 
external danger, usually referred to as times of emergency, governments have 
implemented broad surveillance programs that expanded their authority, 
thus potentially limiting the rights and freedoms of the people (Greenwald 
2014; Farber 2008; Akerman 2006). This does not mean that the authorities 
put aside the discussion of transparency, which could be observed in their 
rhetoric, and even in some institutional solutions (Fisher 2017, 280). Still, 
with regard to the national security state, the successful implementation of 
surveillance measures outweighed the possibility of providing information 
about their scope and character. In that perspective, the rhetoric of the execu-
tive, as well as the establishment of a more transparent oversight system, 
created an illusion that excessive secrecy has diminished. This means that 
all of the transparency policies implemented by US government as a result 
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monitoring, or the new rhetoric of openness— are just tools with which to 
convince society that the culture of secrecy has given place to transparency. 
In reality, however, little has changed: national surveillance is conducted in 
secret, both with regard to foreign intelligence collaboration and domestic 
surveillance of potential terrorist suspects. The separation of powers, which 
is an effective means of control among the branches in several constitu-
tional areas, is not effective with regard to national security. The powers of 
the executive, rooted in the principle of secrecy, limit congressional and judi-
cial checks and provide no balance; therefore, the illusion of transparency 
stems mainly from institutional rather than ideological or partisan factors. 
This all leads to a strengthening of the idea of the national surveillance state, 
which can be seen as a permanent feature of governance now substituting for 
the classical national security state (Balkin 2008, 4). If  the national surveil-
lance state becomes more powerful, the erosion of the system of checks and 
balances will continue, further deepening the illusion that Congress and the 
courts are controlling what the executive does in secret.
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